Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a ’#’ character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection. Cl
title: Suspicious Explorer Process with Whitespace Padding - ClickFix/FileFix
id: 3ae9974a-eb09-4044-8e70-8980a50c12c8
related:
- id: 8f2a5c3d-9e4b-4a7c-8d1f-2e5a6b9c3d7e
type: similar
- id: 7a1b4c5e-8f3d-4b9a-7c2e-1f4a5b8c6d9e
type: similar
status: experimental
description: |
Detects process creation with suspicious whitespace padding followed by a '#' character, which may indicate ClickFix or FileFix techniques used to conceal malicious commands from visual inspection.
ClickFix and FileFix are social engineering attack techniques where adversaries distribute phishing documents or malicious links that deceive users into opening the Windows Run dialog box or File Explorer search bar.
The victims are then instructed to paste commands from their clipboard, which contain extensive whitespace padding using various Unicode space characters to push the actual malicious command far to the right, effectively hiding it from immediate view.
references:
- https://expel.com/blog/cache-smuggling-when-a-picture-isnt-a-thousand-words/
- https://mrd0x.com/filefix-clickfix-alternative/
author: Swachchhanda Shrawan Poudel (Nextron Systems)
date: 2025-11-04
modified: 2025-11-26
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.stealth
- attack.t1204.004
- attack.t1027.010
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_explorer:
ParentImage|endswith: '\explorer.exe'
CommandLine|contains: '#'
selection_space_variation:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' ' # En Quad (U+2000)
- ' ' # Em Quad (U+2001)
- ' ' # En Space (U+2002)
- ' ' # Em Space (U+2003)
- ' ' # Three-Per-Em Space (U+2004)
- ' ' # Four-Per-Em Space (U+2005)
- ' ' # Six-Per-Em Space (U+2006)
- ' ' # Figure Space (U+2007)
- ' ' # Punctuation Space (U+2008)
- ' ' # Thin Space (U+2009)
- ' ' # Hair Space (U+200A)
- ' ' # No-Break Space (U+00A0)
- ' ' # Normal space (0x20)
condition: all of selection_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
imProcessCreate
| where ((ParentProcessName endswith "\\explorer.exe" or ActingProcessName endswith "\\explorer.exe") and TargetProcessCommandLine contains "#") and (TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " " or TargetProcessCommandLine contains " ")
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
imProcessCreate | Ensure this data connector is enabled |