This detection identifies potential malware or suspicious artifacts matching the specific signature defined by the YARA rule tElockv090 within Azure Sentinel’s telemetry. Proactive hunting for this indicator is essential to uncover stealthy threats that may evade standard high-severity alerts, allowing the SOC team to validate low-fidelity signals before they escalate into broader incidents.
rule tElockv090
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E8 02 00 00 00 E8 00 E8 00 00 00 00 5E 2B }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the tElockv090 detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Microsoft Defender Antivirus (MSRT) Scheduled Scans
MsMpEng.exe often triggers the rule when it scans large archives or compresses logs in temporary directories.C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MsMpEng.exe and exclude the specific file path pattern C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Scans\*.Scenario: Sysmon Event Collection by Elastic Agent
elastic-agent.exe) frequently performs real-time log ingestion and compression of audit logs, which mimics the behavior detected by tElockv090.elastic-agent.exe and restrict the detection scope to exclude paths under C:\Program Files\Elastic\Agent\data\.Scenario: Backup Operations via Veeam Backup & Replication
Veeam.Backup.Service.exe) creates temporary lock files and archives on the file system to ensure data consistency during replication.Veeam.Backup.Service.exe from detection and whitelist the directory tree C:\ProgramData\Veeam\Backup\*.Scenario: Adobe Acrobat Pro Document Processing
AcroRdrDC.exe), the application generates temporary lock files to manage file access during