This detection identifies potential file-based threats or specific malware signatures matching the “tElockv098tE” YARA pattern within the Azure Sentinel environment. Proactive hunting for this behavior is essential to uncover early-stage indicators of compromise that may not trigger high-severity alerts, allowing the SOC team to investigate low-fidelity signals before they escalate into significant incidents.
rule tElockv098tE
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { E9 25 E4 FF FF 00 00 00 [8] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [12] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [8] 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [4] 00 00 00 00 [4] 00 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the tElockv098tE detection rule, including recommended filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Microsoft Defender Antivirus Engine Updates
MpCmdRun.exe or MsMpEng.exe, which may match the tElockv098tE signature due to its behavior in scanning system directories.C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\MpCmdRun.exe. Additionally, exclude file paths under C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\ from the YARA rule scope during standard maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC).Scenario: Scheduled Veeam Backup Agent Execution
Veeam.Backup.Service.exe) performs heavy I/O operations and scans virtual machine snapshots. The rule may flag the temporary locking mechanisms or the specific binary signature of the backup engine as a potential anomaly.C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication Enterprise Edition\bin64\Veeam.Backup.Service.exe. If the rule relies on file hash matching, whitelist the specific SHA-256 hashes of the installed Veeam version used across the enterprise.Scenario: SCCM (MECM) Software Deployment Tasks
ccmexec.exe service executes installation scripts that often involve creating temporary locked files or modifying