ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity by correlating network and endpoint telemetry against specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Aisuru threat actor. Proactively hunting for these signals in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of Aisuru’s unique footprint enables rapid containment before lateral movement or data exfiltration occurs within the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Aisuru Total IOCs: 23 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`165[.]22[.]191[.]159:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`188[.]166[.]146[.]72:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`206[.]189[.]127[.]191:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`139[.]59[.]178[.]162:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`164[.]90[.]172[.]4:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`178[.]128[.]173[.]150:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`134[.]122[.]68[.]91:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`164[.]90[.]234[.]119:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`167[.]71[.]54[.]89:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`138[.]68[.]169[.]201:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`178[.]128[.]36[.]32:8001`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`188[.]166[.]160[.]153:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`165[.]245[.]209[.]216:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`188[.]166[.]160[.]153:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`134[.]209[.]176[.]36:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`46[.]101[.]160[.]192:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`178[.]128[.]201[.]199:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`46[.]101[.]160[.]192:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`165[.]232[.]112[.]16:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`165[.]232[.]112[.]16:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`167[.]71[.]38[.]182:34567`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`178[.]128[.]201[.]199:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%
ip:port	`45[.]55[.]191[.]196:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-01	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Aisuru
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["134.209.176.36", "178.128.201.199", "178.128.173.150", "165.232.112.16", "188.166.146.72", "206.189.127.191", "138.68.169.201", "46.101.160.192", "165.22.191.159", "164.90.172.4", "165.245.209.216", "167.71.54.89", "139.59.178.162", "188.166.160.153", "164.90.234.119", "45.55.191.196", "134.122.68.91", "167.71.38.182", "178.128.36.32"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["134.209.176.36", "178.128.201.199", "178.128.173.150", "165.232.112.16", "188.166.146.72", "206.189.127.191", "138.68.169.201", "46.101.160.192", "165.22.191.159", "164.90.172.4", "165.245.209.216", "167.71.54.89", "139.59.178.162", "188.166.160.153", "164.90.234.119", "45.55.191.196", "134.122.68.91", "167.71.38.182", "178.128.36.32"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Aisuru

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Endpoint Protection Engine Updates via Scheduled Task
- Context: Enterprise EDR agents (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon) perform nightly signature updates. The update process often downloads and executes a specific hash or file path that matches one of the 23 Aisuru IOCs due to overlapping vendor libraries or shared code signing certificates used by both the EDR provider and the Aisuru threat actor’s infrastructure.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule for processes named MsMpEng.exe (Defender) or FalconSensorService.exe (CrowdStrike) when they are running under the system account (SYSTEM) during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC). Exclude alerts where the file hash matches known EDR update hashes.
Scenario: Admin Deployment of Security Policies via Group Policy
- Context: During a quarterly security policy refresh, System Administrators use tools like SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) or Intune to push new configuration scripts. A specific script used for hardening might invoke a PowerShell command that references an IOCs list containing the same hash as the Aisuru rule, triggering a match during the deployment phase.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the parent process is ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or IntuneManagementExtension.exe. Additionally, filter out events occurring on hosts tagged with “Security-Admin” or within the “IT-Operations” OU, as these are known sources of legitimate policy changes.
Scenario: Automated Compliance Scanning by Internal Security Tools
- Context: The organization runs a continuous compliance scanner (