ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving four specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the Aisuru threat actor, enabling the identification of potential reconnaissance or initial access attempts within the environment. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly isolate affected assets and mitigate the high-severity risks associated with this known threat before it escalates into a broader incident.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Aisuru Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`104[.]248[.]41[.]207:34567`	botnet_cc	2026-08-31	100%
ip:port	`167[.]99[.]128[.]245:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-31	100%
ip:port	`174[.]138[.]30[.]59:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-31	100%
ip:port	`167[.]99[.]194[.]254:9034`	botnet_cc	2026-08-31	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Aisuru
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["174.138.30.59", "167.99.128.245", "167.99.194.254", "104.248.41.207"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["174.138.30.59", "167.99.128.245", "167.99.194.254", "104.248.41.207"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Aisuru

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Aisuru IOCs detection rule, along with targeted filtering strategies suitable for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Updates
- Context: Enterprise endpoints running CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) often trigger the Aisuru IOCs during their nightly update cycles. The security agents download definition updates from external repositories that share IP ranges or hash signatures with the Aisuru threat intelligence feed, causing a match on legitimate traffic.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on Process Name and Time Window. Exclude alerts where ProcessName matches CnsService.exe (CrowdStrike) or MsMpEng.exe (MDE) occurring between 01:00 and 05:00 local time. Additionally, whitelist the specific update server IP ranges used by these vendors in the detection logic.
Scenario: Automated Patch Management Deployments
- Context: During a weekly patching window managed by Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Ivanti Neurons, the deployment agents initiate outbound connections to download patches and verify signatures. These agents may resolve DNS queries or establish TLS handshakes that align with Aisuru’s known benign IOCs, particularly if the patch repository mirrors the threat feed’s infrastructure.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter based on User Account and Parent Process. Exclude alerts where UserName belongs to the service account (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM-SVC) and the parent process is ccmexec.exe. This ensures that automated deployment traffic does not trigger manual triage tickets.
Scenario: Cloud Backup Agent Connectivity
- Context: Data protection solutions like **Vee