ThreatFox: Evilginx IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving Evilginx phishing campaigns by monitoring for four specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that signal active credential harvesting and session hijacking attempts. A proactive hunt is essential within Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate compromised identities before attackers leverage stolen credentials to establish persistence or escalate privileges across the tenant.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Evilginx Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`185[.]212[.]129[.]143:9000`	botnet_cc	2026-08-21	75%
ip:port	`169[.]58[.]201[.]247:5000`	botnet_cc	2026-08-21	75%
ip:port	`162[.]35[.]170[.]53:2030`	botnet_cc	2026-08-21	75%
ip:port	`162[.]35[.]105[.]100:8443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-21	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Evilginx
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["162.35.105.100", "162.35.170.53", "185.212.129.143", "169.58.201.247"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["162.35.105.100", "162.35.170.53", "185.212.129.143", "169.58.201.247"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Evilginx

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Evilginx IOCs rule, tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Phishing Simulation Campaigns
- Context: Security teams frequently use tools like KnowBe4, Proofpoint Essentials, or GoPhish to run large-scale phishing simulations. These platforms often utilize cloud-hosted landing pages that mimic the structure of Evilginx’s “phishing-as-a-service” architecture, causing their URLs and IP ranges to match the rule’s IOCs.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion list for the specific IP address ranges and domain suffixes used by your internal phishing simulation vendor (e.g., *.knowbe4.com, *.proofpoint.com) within the detection logic, or tag these traffic flows with a “Phishing-Sim” attribute to bypass the alert.
Scenario: Scheduled Cloud Backup Agents
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions such as Veeam, Rubrik, or Azure Backup often perform scheduled jobs during off-hours that connect to external SaaS storage endpoints. If these vendors utilize shared infrastructure or specific CDN nodes that overlap with Evilginx’s known IOCs, the background synchronization traffic will trigger the rule.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 02:00–06:00 local time) for hosts tagged as “Backup-Server” or explicitly exclude the specific destination IPs of your backup provider’s regional gateways from the detection scope.
Scenario: Third-Party SSO and Identity Federation
- Context: Organizations relying on Okta, Azure Active Directory (Entra ID), or Ping Identity for Single Sign-On often route authentication traffic through shared identity providers. Evil