This hunt targets known indicators of compromise associated with the Potassium threat actor to identify potential intrusions or lateral movement activities. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to detect and isolate compromised assets before the adversary can establish persistence or escalate privileges.
Malware Family: Potassium Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 89[.]185[.]82[.]38:15987 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| ip:port | 89[.]185[.]82[.]37:15987 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Potassium
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["89.185.82.38", "89.185.82.37"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["89.185.82.38", "89.185.82.37"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
java.exe with a specific JAR path, or websphere.exe) and the event type is a file read or log write rather than an active connection or execution.FalconSensor.exe, cb.exe, or sentinelone-agent.exe) and the action is a file write to the agent’s local data directory (e.g., C:\ProgramData\CrowdStrike\ or C:\ProgramData\CB\).powershell.exe or python.exe and the command line