ThreatFox: IClickFix IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis detects adversaries leveraging IClickFix malware to exfiltrate sensitive data by exploiting compromised credentials delivered through phishing campaigns with malicious links. Proactive hunting in Azure Sentinel is essential to identify early indicators of this command-and-control activity and prevent unauthorized access before significant data loss occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: IClickFix Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: domain

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - IClickFix
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["mole.albaikmenuonline.com", "rain.afghankabobgrill.com"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — IClickFix

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: IClickFix IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

• Legitimate Help Desk Ticketing System Integration

  • Scenario: The organization utilizes a legitimate third-party IT service management tool (e.g., ServiceNow or Jira) that integrates with IClickFix’s domain for ticket updates, status webhooks, and automated notifications. When the integration service polls the iclickfix.com domain to update ticket statuses, it triggers the rule due to outbound DNS queries matching the IOC domains.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a whitelist entry for the specific Service Account (e.g., svc-it-integration) and restrict the exclusion to traffic originating from the “Help Desk” subnet or specific IP ranges associated with the IT operations server cluster.

• Scheduled Endpoint Management Agent Updates

  • Scenario: The enterprise endpoint management solution (e.g., Microsoft Intune, SCCM, or Ivanti) has a scheduled task configured to check for software updates and policy compliance against IClickFix’s update servers during off-hours (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00). These background processes initiate HTTPS connections to the IClickFix C2 domains, mimicking the data exfiltration behavior of the malware.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic generated by the specific process names of the management agents (e.g., IntuneAgent.exe, ccmexec.exe) when communicating with the known IClickFix IP addresses. Additionally, apply a time-based filter to suppress alerts outside the defined maintenance window if the activity is purely update-related.

• Phishing Simulation Platform Traffic

  • Scenario: The security team uses a phishing simulation platform (e.g., Proofpoint or KnowBe4) that hosts training