This hunt detects adversary activity involving specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the SmartApeSG threat actor, signaling potential reconnaissance or initial access attempts within the organization’s network. A SOC team should proactively search for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify early-stage intrusions and mitigate risks before they escalate into broader security incidents.
Malware Family: SmartApeSG Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: domain, url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | hazelcolonnade.net | botnet_cc | 2026-08-25 | 100% |
| url | hxxps://hazelcolonnade.net/handler/status-hook.js | botnet_cc | 2026-08-25 | 100% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["hazelcolonnade.net"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - SmartApeSG
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://hazelcolonnade.net/handler/status-hook.js"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: SmartApeSG IOCs detection rule, including recommended filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Automated Security Tool Updates via Scheduled Tasks
DOMAIN\svc-antivirus) executing on the update server host (SRV-UPD-01). Additionally, filter out traffic originating from the known IP range of the SmartApeSG distribution point if it is hosted internally.Scenario: Admin Manual IOC Ingestion via PowerShell
Import-SmartApeIOCs.ps1) running under the DOMAIN\Admin-SEC account to fetch and parse JSON files from the SmartApeSG portal, generating network sessions that mimic the rule’s trigger conditions.powershell.exe (or specifically pwsh.exe) executed by members of the “Security Admins” group. Implement a filter to suppress alerts if the command line contains specific keywords like -ImportSmartApe or references to the internal script repository path (\\fileserver\scripts\ioc\).Scenario: Third-Party SIEM Integration Sync