This hunt identifies potential compromise by matching network traffic and asset data against 24 known indicators of compromise associated with the AMOS malware family. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to detect stealthy lateral movement or command-and-control channels before the adversary establishes a persistent foothold in the environment.
Malware Family: AMOS Total IOCs: 24 IOC Types: sha256_hash, ip:port, url
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sha256_hash | 2f12f28e914ed3cfe049cd577c53137634a29174732da0bf098e347d3650c6ab | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 1e216d7d2de6718b97f278e0f9b3d8a6079cc5e33ba5c15d7fc73cf9840259ec | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | a03c2fea3ac9a3bc970ee3f5fa6ac546b930c7bafda2b6d3df9021daa0a8eb08 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | ba0bee414c92ac642d8614277acff7291a7c61c349701eff47c7b87e88cad6fb | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 83c9fb78ff1bac4a2fb69bcbb57a0a8295834a1c2a0fb1d1e13b7bbbb8903c7a | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Wuvulule | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 29bb9dbc179b5dbdea0cfed298b555749fe423fe52291b18f002de5d607d020a | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Cetoyoj | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Lelufo | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Sidadub | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 38c8c79ec773bfc700559243293f4b4409756d5adf63ad78a08d7ca2f38ee0dc | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 63320c69b5733e125a587216bf2a93ac239c2a98686b2a1a00ec23f2b4177648 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 0f5669e692760a1316a750622ecd871897d32da3486dd323f024d680543c368a | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 73491d3f3bcfe0c1d4ebefecf8230d0c460fa89703381d9b8923daaa4be170f4 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 579fb6787dd60d5fb1ebfe275ccfa58e4b73db4cdc4909de23ac5dd3a9c52439 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/default | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Toyeruj | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Lavagaluh | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/Cleaner | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| url | hxxp://178[.]16[.]54[.]55/MLD | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| ip:port | 178[.]16[.]54[.]55:80 | payload_delivery | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | 983f53dd83102298ed0a96acc484ee0f3f3be1a2e70a9c93694f3645b568b9eb | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | e3c99b601d2ceda8d75b0df433232144b397508f4682e394affcee8d1b0eb343 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
| sha256_hash | b9c948ee46b35d13624acd547d21c34096863d63e6f73735bf494042220780b8 | payload | 2026-09-28 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AMOS
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["178.16.54.55"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["178.16.54.55"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - AMOS
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["http://178.16.54.55/Wuvulule", "http://178.16.54.55/Cetoyoj", "http://178.16.54.55/Lelufo", "http://178.16.54.55/Sidadub", "http://178.16.54.55/default", "http://178.16.54.55/Toyeruj", "http://178.16.54.55/Lavagaluh", "http://178.16.54.55/Cleaner", "http://178.16.54.55/MLD"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - AMOS
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["2f12f28e914ed3cfe049cd577c53137634a29174732da0bf098e347d3650c6ab", "1e216d7d2de6718b97f278e0f9b3d8a6079cc5e33ba5c15d7fc73cf9840259ec", "a03c2fea3ac9a3bc970ee3f5fa6ac546b930c7bafda2b6d3df9021daa0a8eb08", "ba0bee414c92ac642d8614277acff7291a7c61c349701eff47c7b87e88cad6fb", "83c9fb78ff1bac4a2fb69bcbb57a0a8295834a1c2a0fb1d1e13b7bbbb8903c7a", "29bb9dbc179b5dbdea0cfed298b555749fe423fe52291b18f002de5d607d020a", "38c8c79ec773bfc700559243293f4b4409756d5adf63ad78a08d7ca2f38ee0dc", "63320c69b5733e125a587216bf2a93ac239c2a98686b2a1a00ec23f2b4177648", "0f5669e692760a1316a750622ecd871897d32da3486dd323f024d680543c368a", "73491d3f3bcfe0c1d4ebefecf8230d0c460fa89703381d9b8923daaa4be170f4", "579fb6787dd60d5fb1ebfe275ccfa58e4b73db4cdc4909de23ac5dd3a9c52439", "983f53dd83102298ed0a96acc484ee0f3f3be1a2e70a9c93694f3645b568b9eb", "e3c99b601d2ceda8d75b0df433232144b397508f4682e394affcee8d1b0eb343", "b9c948ee46b35d13624acd547d21c34096863d63e6f73735bf494042220780b8"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
UrlClickEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A DevOps engineer uses curl or wget to download a specific AMOS IOA hash (e.g., a known benign library version that shares a hash with an AMOS sample) from a trusted internal artifact repository (like Artifactory or Nexus) during a CI/CD pipeline execution.
10.20.0.0/24) AND the destination port is 80 or 443 AND the user account belongs to the svc-cicd service group.Scenario: An IT administrator performs a manual software deployment using rsync or scp to push a configuration file or small binary (matching an AMOS IOA hash) to a remote server for testing, where the file is temporarily stored in /tmp or C:\Users\Public\Downloads before being moved to its final location.
.*[/\\]tmp[/\\].* or .*[/\\]Downloads[/\\].* AND the process name is rsync, scp, powershell, or cmd AND the user is a member of the Domain Admins or IT-Admins group.Scenario: A security team runs a scheduled vulnerability scan or integrity check using a tool like Nessus or Qualys that downloads a small probe or signature file (matching an AMOS IOA hash) to a temporary directory on the target host to verify checksums or test execution permissions.
nessusd, qualys_agent, or vuln_scanner AND the file is