This hunt targets the presence of known PHP Shin webshell indicators, which adversaries deploy to establish persistent, stealthy command-and-control access to compromised web servers. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify and isolate infected assets before the webshell is leveraged for lateral movement or data exfiltration.
Malware Family: php.shin_webshell Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | wrkmb21091.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
| domain | welypubo.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
| domain | witani.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
| domain | muzeqoci.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
| domain | qiqarife.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
| domain | vc4625eicq.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-09-08 | 50% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - php.shin_webshell
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["wrkmb21091.workers.dev", "welypubo.workers.dev", "witani.workers.dev", "muzeqoci.workers.dev", "qiqarife.workers.dev", "vc4625eicq.workers.dev"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
shin framework or a custom plugin relying on the specific file structure or hash signatures of the php.shin_webshell. The IOC matches a legitimate library file (e.g., shin.php or a specific class file) rather than the malicious payload.
/wp-content/plugins/*/lib/ or /vendor/shin/) and allow specific file hashes if they are part of a signed, version-controlled repository./var/lib/jenkins/workspace/, /tmp/ci-cache/, or .gitlab-runner/) and exclude processes initiated by the CI/CD agent service account.php.shin_webshell IOCs in a local directory (e.g., C:\Tools\IOCs\ or /opt/security/iocs/) for testing, documentation, or integration with threat intelligence platforms (e.g., MISP, TheHive, or Cortex). The detection rule flags these staging files as active threats.
C:\Tools\, `/opt