This hunt detects adversary activity involving the php.shin_webshell web shell, a tool frequently used by threat actors to establish persistent access and execute commands on compromised PHP-based servers. A SOC team should proactively search for these specific IOCs in Azure Sentinel because early identification of this web shell can prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration before the adversary fully establishes control over the environment.
Malware Family: php.shin_webshell Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: domain
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| domain | qibanopy.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-08-20 | 50% |
| domain | iritageneral.workers.dev | botnet_cc | 2026-08-20 | 50% |
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - php.shin_webshell
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["qibanopy.workers.dev", "iritageneral.workers.dev"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios and their corresponding filters/exclusions for the ThreatFox: php.shin_webshell IOCs rule in an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Automated Web Server Patching via Configuration Management
php.shin_webshell (e.g., standard library files or updated core modules).ansible-runner.exe, puppet-agent.exe) and Source IP. Exclude alerts where the parent process is a known configuration management tool running during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC).Scenario: CI/CD Pipeline Artifact Deployment
index.php or framework files.svc-deploy-jenkins) and restricts detection to non-standard directories. If the file path is within the standard application root (e.g., C:\inetpub\wwwroot\AppName\), suppress the alert unless it appears in a temporary or unexpected directory like C:\Windows\System32.Scenario: Scheduled Backup and Archiving Operations