This hunt targets the presence of Akira Stealer IOCs to identify compromised endpoints where this infostealer is actively harvesting credentials, browser data, and cryptocurrency wallet information. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to detect and isolate infections early, preventing the exfiltration of sensitive data and lateral movement before the adversary establishes a persistent foothold.
Malware Family: Akira Stealer Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha1_hash, md5_hash, sha256_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sha256_hash | c42e431a727120c9da477c32f1ffe0b5ac46805ff7bc0516252da29a0d172bcd | payload | 2026-09-05 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 532749e27f6b9458b4390eed3fb3774ba4126f04 | payload | 2026-09-05 | 95% |
| md5_hash | f398eabde69bc3369038f987fcc17bd4 | payload | 2026-09-05 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Akira Stealer
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["c42e431a727120c9da477c32f1ffe0b5ac46805ff7bc0516252da29a0d172bcd", "532749e27f6b9458b4390eed3fb3774ba4126f04", "f398eabde69bc3369038f987fcc17bd4"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A DevOps team deploys a new internal monitoring agent that uses a generic hash or process name (e.g., monitor.exe or telemetry_svc.dll) matching one of the Akira Stealer IOCs for file integrity or performance tracking.
C:\Program Files\InternalTools\) or filter by parent process being a known service manager (e.g., svchost.exe or services.exe) when the file path does not reside in user-writable directories like %TEMP% or %APPDATA%.Scenario: An IT administrator runs a legitimate third-party cleanup or optimization tool (e.g., CCleaner, IObit Uninstaller, or a custom PowerShell script) that creates temporary files or spawns short-lived processes with names or hashes coincidentally matching the Akira Stealer IOCs during disk cleanup or registry defragmentation.
powershell.exe initiated by explorer.exe with specific arguments, or ccleaner64.exe) and the file location is within standard temp paths (%TEMP%, C:\Windows\Temp) with a short process lifetime (< 30 seconds).Scenario: A security team performs a YARA scan or memory dump analysis using a tool like Volatility or YARA that loads or creates temporary artifacts matching the Akira Stealer IOCs (e.g., specific DLLs or script files) in a dedicated analysis directory.
C:\SecurityTools\, C:\Analysis\) or filter by user account belonging to a privileged security group