ThreatFox: Unidentified VBS 001 IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt hypothesis targets adversary behavior characterized by the presence of six specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the “Unidentified VBS 001” threat family, which may signal an early-stage intrusion or lateral movement attempt. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel to rapidly validate potential threats and initiate containment actions before the adversary establishes a deeper foothold in the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Unidentified VBS 001 Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: domain, ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`27[.]124[.]38[.]42:8383`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	80%
ip:port	`134[.]122[.]136[.]2:8383`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	90%
domain	`bbs.baoxissde.one`	payload_delivery	2026-08-13	80%
domain	`bbs.laokwmsde.art`	payload_delivery	2026-08-13	80%
domain	`rukeyou.com`	payload_delivery	2026-08-13	80%
domain	`varzcommunity.abrdns.com`	payload_delivery	2026-08-13	80%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Unidentified VBS 001
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["27.124.38.42", "134.122.136.2"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["27.124.38.42", "134.122.136.2"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Unidentified VBS 001
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["bbs.baoxissde.one", "bbs.laokwmsde.art", "rukeyou.com", "varzcommunity.abrdns.com"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DnsEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Unidentified VBS 001

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Unidentified VBS 001 IOCs detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions:

Scenario: Scheduled PowerShell Script Execution by IT Automation Tool
- Context: An enterprise automation tool (e.g., Ansible Tower, Jenkins, or SCCM) executes a scheduled nightly job that downloads and runs a .vbs script to patch legacy inventory databases. The script matches the “Unidentified VBS 001” hash signature but is a known, trusted artifact.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on the Process Name (wscript.exe or cscript.exe) and Parent Process Image. Exclude alerts where the parent process is jenkins-agent.exe, ccmexec.exe, or ansible-runner.exe. Additionally, add the specific VBS file hash to a “Trusted Hash” allow-list in ThreatFox.
Scenario: Third-Party Antivirus/EDR Self-Maintenance Tasks
- Context: The organization’s endpoint protection suite (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) runs a background maintenance task that utilizes VBS scripts to update local policy definitions. These scripts often trigger the “Unidentified” flag because they are generated dynamically rather than being static binaries.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter excluding alerts where the User Account is a dedicated service account (e.g., svc-antivirus-maint or SYSTEM) and the process path resides within the vendor’s installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\).
Scenario: Legacy Line-of-Business Application Reporting Module
- Context: A critical legacy ERP system (e.g.,