ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving the nine specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the AdaptixC2 command and control infrastructure, which are known to facilitate persistent lateral movement and data exfiltration. Proactively hunting for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of AdaptixC2 traffic allows the SOC team to disrupt active campaigns before they escalate into broader network compromises or significant data breaches.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: AdaptixC2 Total IOCs: 9 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`64[.]94[.]84[.]119:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	75%
ip:port	`38[.]147[.]162[.]163:15087`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	75%
ip:port	`194[.]182[.]87[.]116:4321`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	75%
ip:port	`144[.]124[.]234[.]128:49999`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	75%
ip:port	`123[.]136[.]92[.]100:49999`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	75%
ip:port	`64[.]94[.]84[.]119:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-14	100%
ip:port	`64[.]94[.]84[.]119:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-14	100%
ip:port	`64[.]94[.]84[.]119:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-14	100%
ip:port	`64[.]227[.]74[.]35:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-14	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AdaptixC2
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.94.84.119", "194.182.87.116", "144.124.234.128", "64.227.74.35", "123.136.92.100", "38.147.162.163"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.94.84.119", "194.182.87.116", "144.124.234.128", "64.227.74.35", "123.136.92.100", "38.147.162.163"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — AdaptixC2

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: AdaptixC2 IOCs detection rule:

Enterprise Backup Agent Communication
- Scenario: The organization utilizes Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault, where the backup service account regularly connects to external cloud storage gateways. These connections often match AdaptixC2’s known IP ranges or domain hashes used for command and control (C2) channels, triggering alerts on standard backup traffic.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process names VeeamAgent.exe, vbrservice.exe, and commvault from the rule logic if the destination port is restricted to 443 or 8080, provided the source user context is a dedicated service account (e.g., DOMAIN\BackupSvc).
Software Update Mechanisms for Endpoint Protection
- Scenario: The deployed endpoint security solution, such as CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, initiates scheduled update checks. These agents often query external vendor repositories that share infrastructure overlaps with the AdaptixC2 IOCs, specifically regarding certificate hashes and connection patterns during nightly maintenance windows (e.g., 01:00–03:00).
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a suppression rule based on process image paths matching C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\ or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft Defender Antivirus\, combined with a time-based exclusion window of 24 hours during the maintenance schedule.
Third-Party SaaS Integration via Scheduled Tasks
- Scenario: A scheduled task running under the context of an administrative account (e.g., DOMAIN\Admin) executes a PowerShell script to sync data with a cloud CRM or HR platform (e.g., **Sales