This hunt identifies network connections or host artifacts matching known indicators of compromise for the AsyncRAT remote access trojan, a tool frequently deployed by threat actors to establish persistent, low-noise control over compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to detect stealthy RAT deployments before they are leveraged for lateral movement or data exfiltration, reducing the dwell time of this high-severity threat.
Malware Family: AsyncRAT Total IOCs: 10 IOC Types: md5_hash, domain, sha1_hash, sha256_hash, ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 185[.]242[.]3[.]250:8808 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-07 | 75% |
| ip:port | 128[.]90[.]136[.]115:4444 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-07 | 75% |
| sha1_hash | 9522fead5e39391590927f75c4427cc7ebd2d02e | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| md5_hash | 1379414483df8390aa9eabf1e0d143b1 | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | 747b8e6d1285ae88b1cf018515bf808ce00c25fc24e2231d95afabe6cbe1c1c7 | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 5da66e92ab3e6e9884729d835caf33b0b890aaec | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| md5_hash | 944d1a7459e616f7acb2077d930b665c | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | cd17ee97e06ff23641b1176b9bb2b08cc030f55feb2879b64d5806df9df244eb | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| domain | qaqfaxian.com | botnet_cc | 2026-09-07 | 75% |
| domain | predatest.servebeer.com | botnet_cc | 2026-09-07 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.242.3.250", "128.90.136.115"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.242.3.250", "128.90.136.115"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["qaqfaxian.com", "predatest.servebeer.com"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - AsyncRAT
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["9522fead5e39391590927f75c4427cc7ebd2d02e", "1379414483df8390aa9eabf1e0d143b1", "747b8e6d1285ae88b1cf018515bf808ce00c25fc24e2231d95afabe6cbe1c1c7", "5da66e92ab3e6e9884729d835caf33b0b890aaec", "944d1a7459e616f7acb2077d930b665c", "cd17ee97e06ff23641b1176b9bb2b08cc030f55feb2879b64d5806df9df244eb"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
AsyncRAT loader DLL (often used for obfuscation or specific memory manipulation in older codebases) into the application artifact. The IOC hash matches the deployed binary on the web server or application node.
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\legacy-app\lib\) or exclude hashes associated with known internal build artifacts by correlating with the deployment pipeline ID.C:\Program Files\Common Files\ that matches one of the 10 IOCs.
C:\Program Files\VendorName\) and verify the digital signature matches the expected vendor certificate.%TEMP%, C:\Windows\Temp) created by known service accounts (e.g., svc-maintenance) and correlate with the scheduled task name to ensure it is part of the approved maintenance window.