This hunt detects adversary activity linked to the DarkTortilla campaign by identifying specific indicators of compromise across network and endpoint telemetry within Azure Sentinel. Proactively hunting for these signatures is critical because DarkTortilla targets cloud infrastructure with sophisticated persistence mechanisms that may evade standard signature-based defenses until lateral movement occurs.
Malware Family: DarkTortilla Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha1_hash, sha256_hash, md5_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sha256_hash | 68c9207a1e4e703b897300fc6c21cf0472549b352d80a64259e21ed4fdfe63a4 | payload | 2026-07-16 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 54f998f02bb83c71a0746cd38ca8203ed9a90a3a | payload | 2026-07-16 | 95% |
| md5_hash | 1f017ca7bcdae763c27483193017747a | payload | 2026-07-16 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - DarkTortilla
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["68c9207a1e4e703b897300fc6c21cf0472549b352d80a64259e21ed4fdfe63a4", "54f998f02bb83c71a0746cd38ca8203ed9a90a3a", "1f017ca7bcdae763c27483193017747a"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: DarkTortilla IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Signature Updates
FalconService.exe (CrowdStrike) or MsMpEng.exe (Defender) and the user context is a service account like svc-edr-updater.SIEM Content Library Synchronization
ThreatIntel_Sync_Job) running under the system account siem-admin or originating from the SIEM indexer subnet.Vulnerability Management Scanning