ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Havoc post-exploitation tool, which is frequently used by threat actors to establish persistence and execute lateral movement within compromised networks. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel because early identification of Havoc-related artifacts enables rapid containment of advanced threats before they can fully entrench themselves or exfiltrate sensitive data.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["217.217.97.164", "106.15.65.247"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["217.217.97.164", "106.15.65.247"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs detection rule, including tailored filters and exclusions to reduce noise in an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Threat Intelligence Feed Ingestion

  • Context: Enterprise Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) platforms like Splunk or Microsoft Sentinel are configured with scheduled tasks that periodically pull the latest IOCs from the ThreatFox platform. When these jobs run, they generate network traffic and file access events matching Havoc signatures as part of their normal update cycle.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the source process name (threatfox_updater.exe or splunkd) and restrict the alert to exclude events occurring during specific maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC). Alternatively, filter out traffic originating from known internal IP ranges dedicated to the SIEM infrastructure.

• Scenario: Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) Scanning Artifacts

  • Context: Tools such as CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint perform deep file system scans that may temporarily load Havoc-associated DLLs or scripts into memory to verify their integrity. This activity can trigger the “Havoc IOCs” logic even though no malicious execution is occurring, appearing as a legitimate security scan rather than an attack.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement a filter that suppresses alerts where the parent process is identified as the EDR agent itself (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\fsq.exe or MsMpEng.exe). Additionally, exclude events where the file hash matches a known “good” baseline stored in the enterprise’s internal allowlist.

• Scenario: Software Deployment via Configuration Management

  • Context: During routine patching cycles,