ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity associated with the sophisticated Havoc malware family by monitoring for its specific indicators of compromise within network and endpoint telemetry. A proactive hunt in Azure Sentinel is essential to rapidly uncover early-stage infections and mitigate potential lateral movement before the malware can establish a persistent foothold in the environment.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`4[.]193[.]136[.]143:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	75%
ip:port	`43[.]134[.]42[.]247:22`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`43[.]134[.]42[.]247:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`4[.]193[.]136[.]143:3389`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`4[.]193[.]136[.]143:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`4[.]193[.]136[.]143:22`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`185[.]130[.]45[.]240:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	50%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["4.193.136.143", "43.134.42.247", "185.130.45.240"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["4.193.136.143", "43.134.42.247", "185.130.45.240"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

Scenario: EDR Agent Self-Update Mechanism
- Context: The endpoint protection suite (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or CrowdStrike Falcon) performs scheduled self-updates. These updates often download new definition packages that contain executable binaries matching Havoc’s hash signatures or behavioral patterns, specifically when the update service runs under a high-privilege system account.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on the process name MsMpEng.exe (Defender) or FalconSensorService.exe (CrowdStrike) running with the user context NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. Additionally, exclude network traffic originating from known vendor update IP ranges (e.g., Microsoft Update CDN IPs) to prevent hash-based triggers.
Scenario: Scheduled PowerShell Script Execution for Patch Management
- Context: A nightly scheduled task executes a custom PowerShell script (Update-PatchStatus.ps1) that queries the network and writes logs. The script invokes powershell.exe with arguments containing specific IOCs (such as encoded command strings or specific DLL imports) that mimic Havoc’s initial execution chain, particularly when interacting with the registry to store patch status.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a logic filter that excludes alerts where the parent process is Task Scheduler (svchost.exe -k netsvcs) and the command line contains the specific script path (e.g., \Scripts\PatchManagement\Update-PatchStatus.ps1). Ensure the exclusion applies only when the execution time falls within the maintenance window (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time).
Scenario: Enterprise Backup Software Snapshot Operations *