ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection targets adversary behavior involving the execution of Havoc post-exploitation tools to establish persistent command and control channels within compromised environments. Proactive hunting is essential in Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage lateral movement and data exfiltration attempts that may bypass standard signature-based defenses, ensuring rapid containment before broader network compromise occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`154[.]36[.]188[.]233:8080`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	75%
ip:port	`93[.]152[.]223[.]39:9443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	75%
ip:port	`51[.]38[.]39[.]19:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	100%
ip:port	`51[.]38[.]39[.]19:22`	botnet_cc	2026-08-13	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["93.152.223.39", "51.38.39.19", "154.36.188.233"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["93.152.223.39", "51.38.39.19", "154.36.188.233"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Scenario: Legitimate automated vulnerability scanning by internal security teams using Tenable Nessus or Qualys, which frequently probe external assets and generate network traffic matching Havoc’s command-and-control (C2) beacon patterns.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a detection exclusion for the specific IP address ranges of the vulnerability scanner appliances and whitelist the associated service accounts (e.g., svc_nessus, svc_qualys) to prevent alerts on their scheduled scanning jobs.
Scenario: Scheduled backup operations performed by Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault, where the backup agents initiate connections to off-site repositories that mimic the specific User-Agent strings and port usage defined in the Havoc IOC set.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a rule exclusion based on the destination IP addresses of known cloud storage buckets (e.g., AWS S3, Azure Blob) used by backup agents, specifically filtering out traffic from the vbrsvc or commvault service accounts during their defined maintenance windows.
Scenario: Routine software update deployments managed by Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune, where the deployment engine downloads patches and configuration files that trigger network signatures identical to Havoc’s data exfiltration indicators.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic originating from the SCCM site system servers and Intune management points, filtering specifically for the ccmexec process ID and whitelisting the known update server domains (e.g., *.update.microsoft.com) against the detection logic.
Scenario: Automated log aggregation and SIEM ingestion tasks performed by Splunk Universal Forwarders or Elastic Beats, which establish persistent connections to central collectors that match the Havoc IOCs regarding connection frequency and payload size.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: