ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Havoc post-exploitation tool, which is frequently utilized by threat actors for lateral movement and command execution within compromised networks. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of Havoc usage can reveal active post-compromise operations before adversaries establish persistent footholds or exfiltrate sensitive data.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.176.199.134", "62.171.166.237"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["64.176.199.134", "62.171.166.237"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions tailored for a legitimate enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Threat Intelligence Feed Ingestion by EDR

  • Context: Enterprise Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions like CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint automatically download threat intelligence updates. These feeds often contain generic IOCs that match the Havoc signature, triggering alerts when the EDR agent processes them locally rather than an actual attack occurring on a host.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude process paths belonging to known security agents (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\FalconSensor\csfalcon.exe or C:\Windows\System32\mpclient.dll) and filter out events where the source IP is an internal DNS server or a dedicated threat intelligence appliance.

• Scenario: Scheduled Security Scans by Internal Vulnerability Management Tools

  • Context: Scheduled jobs running on nights or weekends using tools like Tenable Nessus, Qualys, or Rapid7 InsightVM actively probe endpoints and network devices. These scanners often simulate traffic patterns that mimic Havoc IOCs (such as specific HTTP headers or connection signatures) to verify patch levels, causing the detection logic to flag them as potential threats.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a time-based exclusion for events occurring during maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time on Saturdays) and exclude source IPs assigned to the vulnerability management server pool (e.g., 192.168.10.x range).

• Scenario: Administrative PowerShell Script Execution for Compliance Audits

  • Context: Security Operations Center (SOC) analysts or compliance teams frequently run