ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity involving specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the Havoc post-exploitation tool, which is frequently utilized by threat actors for lateral movement and command execution. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because Havoc’s presence often signals an advanced attacker who has already established a foothold within the environment and is actively expanding their operational capabilities.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Havoc Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: ip:port

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Havoc
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["2.91.185.72", "162.243.160.70"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["2.91.185.72", "162.243.160.70"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Havoc

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the ThreatFox: Havoc IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Scheduled Vulnerability Scanning by Qualys or Tenable

  • Context: Enterprise vulnerability scanners (e.g., Qualys Cloud Agent, Tenable Nessus) frequently perform active network probes and host checks. If the Havoc IOC list includes specific IP addresses used by these scanner nodes or their update servers, the detection logic may flag routine scanning traffic as a threat match.
  • Suggested Filter: Create an exclusion rule that filters out alerts where the Source IP belongs to the internal “Vulnerability Management” subnet (e.g., 10.x.x.x/24) or matches known scanner hostnames containing keywords like qualys, tenable, or scan-agent.

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM)

  • Context: During scheduled maintenance windows, SCCM (or Intune) pushes updates and configuration scripts to endpoints. If the Havoc IOCs include file hashes or network signatures associated with legitimate patching tools or specific update content libraries used by the organization’s IT team, routine patching activities will trigger false positives.
  • Suggested Filter: Implement a time-based exclusion that suppresses alerts occurring between 02:00 and 06:00 UTC on weekdays for processes named ccmsetup.exe, wsappx, or msiexec when the source user is SYSTEM or a dedicated service account like svc-patch-deploy.

• Scenario: Third-Party Backup Agent Communication (e.g., Veeam or Commvault)

  • Context: Enterprise backup solutions often communicate with external cloud repositories or replication sites. If the Havoc IOC list contains IP addresses belonging to a public