This hunt hypothesis targets adversary behavior involving command-and-control communications or lateral movement utilizing specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the NetWire Remote Control malware family. Proactively searching for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel is critical because NetWire RC often establishes persistent footholds that can be leveraged for long-term data exfiltration and unauthorized system access if not detected early.
Malware Family: NetWire RC Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: md5_hash, sha256_hash, sha1_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| md5_hash | 018669315fa61b7c7a64c8298abd5971 | payload | 2026-07-14 | 95% |
| sha256_hash | dab128d1dba2feeb8762b300bc6ba32eb976cbe33274ac29c2c0d4c4eda5e6f7 | payload | 2026-07-14 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 7f082fa8bd8540595bfcbc719dbcdb19ec7b2ceb | payload | 2026-07-14 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - NetWire RC
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["018669315fa61b7c7a64c8298abd5971", "dab128d1dba2feeb8762b300bc6ba32eb976cbe33274ac29c2c0d4c4eda5e6f7", "7f082fa8bd8540595bfcbc719dbcdb19ec7b2ceb"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: NetWire RC IOCs rule, tailored for an enterprise environment where legitimate administrative and maintenance activities often mimic threat indicators:
Endpoint Management Agent Updates (e.g., Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager / SCCM)
ccmexec.exe) downloads and executes a NetWire RC software update package. This process generates network connections to the vendor’s distribution points and file integrity checks that match the rule’s IOCs (specifically known benign hashes or registry keys associated with the installer).ccmexec.exe or SMSAgentHost.exe where the parent process is a trusted system service, and restrict the scope to specific IP ranges of the internal Software Update Point servers.Automated Security Baseline Audits (e.g., Qualys Policy Compliance or Tenable.sc)
pcsc.exe). The agent performs a deep file system audit and network connectivity check, probing known NetWire RC installation directories and registry paths to verify compliance. These probes trigger the IOCs related to file access and specific service enumeration.pcsc.exe (Qualys) or tenable_agent.exe running under a dedicated service account (e.g., svc-qualys-audit) during standard maintenance windows (e.g., Sunday 02:00–06:00 UTC).Group Policy Object (GPO) Deployment and Software Installation