ThreatFox: NetWire RC IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving six specific indicators of compromise (IOCs) linked to the NetWire Remote Control malware, which is known for establishing persistent command and control channels on compromised endpoints. The SOC team should proactively search for these IOCs within Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage infections and prevent potential data exfiltration or lateral movement before the threat escalates.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: NetWire RC Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: sha1_hash, md5_hash, sha256_hash

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
sha1_hash	`0578ccbe64ee7f6c1f90cf656095dad7059b1587`	payload	2026-08-13	95%
md5_hash	`6ff68578110de0105fc3a1a1ab635dd3`	payload	2026-08-13	95%
sha1_hash	`46da9bf913828dfdc3cbfc435e414285ba5cb715`	payload	2026-08-13	95%
md5_hash	`ef5b6211a47d0bec3ddb8d77b9c9586a`	payload	2026-08-13	95%
sha256_hash	`c1770108b0d0e6dde3fd5d588a85af3409ad41581784b1734a3eec637fddb15d`	payload	2026-08-13	95%
sha256_hash	`d1ccedd9d262377aa1e28d0ba13b49cbd6511ccaa5e95db0e506064b2861f6f7`	payload	2026-08-13	95%

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - NetWire RC
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["0578ccbe64ee7f6c1f90cf656095dad7059b1587", "6ff68578110de0105fc3a1a1ab635dd3", "46da9bf913828dfdc3cbfc435e414285ba5cb715", "ef5b6211a47d0bec3ddb8d77b9c9586a", "c1770108b0d0e6dde3fd5d588a85af3409ad41581784b1734a3eec637fddb15d", "d1ccedd9d262377aa1e28d0ba13b49cbd6511ccaa5e95db0e506064b2861f6f7"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — NetWire RC

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: NetWire RC IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates via WSUS
- Context: The endpoint protection suite (e.g., Microsoft Defender or CrowdStrike) is configured to download definition updates from the NetWire RC repository during off-hours. This triggers the IOCs as the update service connects to known NetWire endpoints to fetch signatures.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exception for traffic originating from the System account on hosts within the “Endpoint Management” OU, specifically targeting the process MpCmdG.exe (Microsoft Defender) or csagent.exe (CrowdStrike). Exclude these processes if the destination port is 443 and the connection occurs between 02:00 and 06:00 local time.
Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune
- Context: The enterprise uses System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune to push security patches. During the deployment phase, client agents query NetWire RC repositories to validate patch integrity and download payloads, generating network connections that match the rule’s IOCs.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic where the source process is ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.IntuneManagementExtension.exe. Add a filter condition requiring the destination IP range to be within the known internal distribution point subnet, ensuring only legitimate patch server communications are ignored.
Scenario: Third-Party Security Scanner Scans
- Context: A scheduled vulnerability assessment tool (e.g., Tenable Nessus or Qualys) runs daily scans against the network. The scanner’s agent communicates with NetWire RC to fetch threat intelligence feeds and correlate local scan results