This hypothesis targets adversary behavior where threat actors deploy the NonEuclid Remote Access Trojan (RAT) to establish persistent command-and-control channels and exfiltrate sensitive data via its known indicators of compromise. A SOC team should proactively hunt for these specific IOCs within Azure Sentinel to rapidly identify early-stage infections, as NonEuclid’s sophisticated evasion capabilities often allow it to remain undetected by standard signature-based defenses until significant damage occurs.
Malware Family: NonEuclid RAT Total IOCs: 14 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1383 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1394 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:7000 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:8848 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1297 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1313 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1329 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1342 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1360 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1366 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1372 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1180 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1293 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]228:1154 | botnet_cc | 2026-08-14 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - NonEuclid RAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["91.92.47.228"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["91.92.47.228"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: NonEuclid RAT IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Legitimate Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
Process Name being ccmsetup.exe or intuneagent.exe, combined with a filter where the User Account matches the service account used for deployments (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM_Service).Scenario: Scheduled Backup Job Execution
Parent Process is TaskScheduler.exe or svchost.exe (specifically the Veeam service) AND the execution time falls within the defined maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 to 04:00 local time).Scenario: Admin Remote Session via RDP/TeamViewer
HKLM\Software) to establish the remote control tunnel, triggering the NonEuclid RAT detection logic.