This hunt detects adversary activity involving the PureRAT remote access trojan by identifying matches against seven specific indicators of compromise within Azure Sentinel logs. A proactive search is essential to rapidly identify and isolate infected endpoints before attackers leverage PureRAT’s capabilities for long-term persistence, data exfiltration, and lateral movement across the enterprise network.
Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 91[.]92[.]47[.]214:6666 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 93[.]114[.]183[.]130:8711 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 56[.]69[.]248[.]141:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 56[.]69[.]232[.]66:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 45[.]139[.]104[.]204:443 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 45[.]139[.]104[.]204:55009 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
| ip:port | 172[.]94[.]14[.]210:56013 | botnet_cc | 2026-09-02 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["172.94.14.210", "56.69.232.66", "91.92.47.214", "93.114.183.130", "56.69.248.141", "45.139.104.204"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["172.94.14.210", "56.69.232.66", "91.92.47.214", "93.114.183.130", "56.69.248.141", "45.139.104.204"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Endpoint Protection Policy Deployment via Microsoft Intune
HKLM\Software\PureRAT or specific DLL paths in C:\ProgramData).msdtc.exe, IntuneManagementExtension.exe, or TaskHostW.exe and the parent process is Microsoft.Intune.Management.Extension. Additionally, filter out events occurring during known maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) where bulk policy updates are scheduled.Scenario: Automated Backup Job Execution by Veeam or Commvault
VeeamAgent.exe, vbr.exe, or CommServeAgent.exe. Furthermore, exclude network traffic originating from the backup subnet range (e.g., 10.x.x.0/24) destined for known internal backup repository IPs to prevent C2-like traffic triggers.Scenario: Software Installation via SCCM (Configuration Manager)