ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving four specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the PureRAT remote access trojan, which is known for enabling persistent command and control capabilities on compromised endpoints. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel because early identification of PureRAT can prevent lateral movement and data exfiltration before the malware establishes deep persistence within the network.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`45[.]156[.]87[.]215:1111`	botnet_cc	2026-08-30	75%
ip:port	`31[.]57[.]38[.]7:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-30	75%
ip:port	`217[.]60[.]195[.]109:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-30	75%
ip:port	`104[.]250[.]180[.]85:56013`	botnet_cc	2026-08-30	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["217.60.195.109", "104.250.180.85", "31.57.38.7", "45.156.87.215"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["217.60.195.109", "104.250.180.85", "31.57.38.7", "45.156.87.215"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — PureRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusions for the ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs detection rule:

Scenario: Endpoint Security Agent Communication
- Context: The enterprise uses CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint. These agents frequently connect to their respective update servers (e.g., falconupdate.crowdstrike.com or go.microsoft.com) using specific IP ranges and ports that overlap with PureRAT’s known IOCs. The agent’s background telemetry service may initiate connections matching the PureRAT hash signatures during scheduled health checks.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion for traffic originating from the CrowdStrike Falcon Sensor Service (FalconService.exe) or Defender Antivirus Service (MsMpEng.exe). Filter by process path (e.g., C:\Program Files\CrowdStrike\ or C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\) to ignore connections from these trusted binaries regardless of the destination IOCs.
Scenario: Scheduled Cloud Backup Jobs
- Context: The organization runs nightly backups using Veeam Backup & Replication. During the scheduled window (e.g., 02:00 AM), the Veeam Transport Service initiates connections to cloud storage gateways or S3 buckets. If PureRAT IOCs include specific DNS names or IP ranges used by public cloud providers (like AWS or Azure) that also host these backup endpoints, the rule triggers on legitimate backup traffic.
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion for the Veeam Transport Service process (vssrpt.exe) during the defined maintenance window (e.g., 01:30–04:30). Additionally, exclude specific destination IP ranges known to be used by the enterprise’s primary cloud storage provider