ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets the presence of PureRAT, a remote access trojan that enables adversaries to establish persistent control and exfiltrate data from compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify stealthy malware infections early, preventing attackers from leveraging the RAT for lateral movement or data theft before they escalate privileges.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`98[.]89[.]43[.]158:443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-10	75%
ip:port	`124[.]156[.]108[.]12:443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-10	75%
ip:port	`107[.]172[.]134[.]37:443`	botnet_cc	2026-09-10	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.156.108.12", "98.89.43.158", "107.172.134.37"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.156.108.12", "98.89.43.158", "107.172.134.37"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — PureRAT

False Positive Guidance

Scenario: Legacy Java Application Deployment
- Context: A DevOps team deploys a legacy Java-based internal tool (e.g., an old inventory management system) that bundles a specific version of the Java Runtime Environment (JRE) or uses a known third-party library. The PureRAT IOCs often include specific file hashes or paths associated with Java executables or specific .jar files that may overlap with legitimate build artifacts.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the detected file path resides within standard application deployment directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\InternalApps\LegacyInventory\) and the parent process is a known Java launcher (java.exe or javaw.exe) from a trusted vendor directory.
Scenario: Scheduled Backup Agent Execution
- Context: An enterprise backup solution (e.g., Veeam, Commvault, or Acronis) runs scheduled jobs that create temporary executable files or drop specific helper binaries in system temp folders or application data directories. If the backup agent uses a specific helper binary whose hash or path matches one of the PureRAT IOCs (particularly if the IOC is a generic path like C:\Users\Public\ or a common temp file name), it triggers a false positive.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the parent process is a known backup agent service (e.g., VeeamBackupSvc.exe, CommvaultSvc.exe) and the file location is within the backup agent’s designated working directory or temp folder.
Scenario: Third-Party Plugin Installation (Adobe/Office)
- Context: IT admins push updates or install plugins for Adobe Creative Suite or Microsoft Office 365. These installations sometimes drop helper executables or DLLs into C:\Program Files (x86)\Common Files\ or user-specific plugin directories