ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving six specific indicators of compromise linked to the PureRAT remote access trojan, which is frequently used to establish persistent footholds and exfiltrate sensitive data. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because PureRAT’s stealthy nature often evades standard signature-based defenses, requiring manual correlation to identify early-stage infections before lateral movement occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: PureRAT Total IOCs: 6 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`94[.]26[.]3[.]52:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%
ip:port	`95[.]133[.]229[.]218:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%
ip:port	`209[.]99[.]186[.]201:55009`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%
ip:port	`194[.]56[.]225[.]150:56001`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%
ip:port	`154[.]13[.]7[.]199:9999`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%
ip:port	`209[.]99[.]186[.]201:55006`	botnet_cc	2026-08-19	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - PureRAT
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["209.99.186.201", "154.13.7.199", "95.133.229.218", "94.26.3.52", "194.56.225.150"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["209.99.186.201", "154.13.7.199", "95.133.229.218", "94.26.3.52", "194.56.225.150"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — PureRAT

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: PureRAT IOCs detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Endpoint Protection Updates
- Context: Enterprise EDR agents (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon) frequently download definition updates or configuration scripts from trusted cloud repositories. PureRAT IOCs often include specific file hashes or network connections that overlap with these update mechanisms. If the PureRAT IOC list contains a hash matching a standard EDR updater component, every agent refresh triggers an alert.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the Process Name matches known EDR service executables (e.g., MsMpEng.exe, FalconContainer.exe) and the Parent Process is the system update scheduler (svchost.exe -k netsvcs). Additionally, filter by excluding traffic destined for official vendor update domains (e.g., *.microsoft.com, *.crowdstrike.com).
Scenario: Scheduled PowerShell Administrative Scripts
- Context: IT Operations teams often deploy scheduled tasks (via Windows Task Scheduler) that utilize PowerShell to perform routine maintenance, such as log rotation or user provisioning. PureRAT is known for using PowerShell for command execution; if the detection logic flags specific PowerShell command-line arguments or script hashes used in these internal scripts, it will generate high-volume noise during maintenance windows.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion rule based on User Account (e.g., exclude alerts generated by service accounts like DOMAIN\svc-admin-maintenance) and Task Name. Specifically, filter out events where the process path is located in a trusted internal directory (e.g., C:\Scripts\Maintenance\) rather than temporary or user profile directories.
**Scenario: Legitimate Remote Management Tool Usage