This detection rule identifies adversary activity consistent with the Remcos Remote Access Trojan by monitoring for specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) that signal unauthorized remote access and command-and-control communications. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel is critical to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints before attackers can establish persistence or exfiltrate sensitive data across the organization’s cloud infrastructure.
Malware Family: Remcos Total IOCs: 4 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 89[.]106[.]83[.]75:8015 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 75% |
| ip:port | 185[.]115[.]164[.]60:61102 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 75% |
| ip:port | 185[.]115[.]164[.]60:7572 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 75% |
| ip:port | 185[.]115[.]164[.]59:11322 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-08 | 75% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remcos
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.115.164.59", "89.106.83.75", "185.115.164.60"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["185.115.164.59", "89.106.83.75", "185.115.164.60"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are four specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Remcos IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Legacy Archives
process_name is the known EDR service (e.g., csagent.exe, ssosd.exe) AND the file_path contains keywords like _archive_, _backup_, or specific legacy directory paths (e.g., \\FileServer\IT_Archives\Remcos_Legacy).Software Deployment via Configuration Management
remcos_config.xml (which shares a hash with one of the Remcos IOCs) into a temporary staging folder (C:\Temp\DeployStaging) before installation. The detection logic triggers on the creation or access of this legitimate configuration artifact during the automated patching window.parent_process_name is a known deployment tool (e.g., `ccmexec