ThreatFox: Remcos IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets the presence of known Remcos Remote Access Trojan indicators, which adversaries deploy to establish persistent, stealthy control over compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel is critical because Remcos is frequently used in targeted attacks to exfiltrate data and execute commands, making early detection essential to prevent lateral movement and data loss.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Remcos Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`74[.]201[.]173[.]189:15702`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	100%
ip:port	`155[.]103[.]69[.]85:2671`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	100%
ip:port	`130[.]12[.]182[.]234:2404`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	75%
ip:port	`155[.]103[.]70[.]196:2404`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	75%
ip:port	`46[.]151[.]182[.]237:9090`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	75%
ip:port	`130[.]12[.]182[.]217:2404`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	75%
ip:port	`108[.]165[.]185[.]204:2404`	botnet_cc	2026-09-14	75%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Remcos
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["155.103.69.85", "46.151.182.237", "130.12.182.217", "74.201.173.189", "155.103.70.196", "130.12.182.234", "108.165.185.204"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["155.103.69.85", "46.151.182.237", "130.12.182.217", "74.201.173.189", "155.103.70.196", "130.12.182.234", "108.165.185.204"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Remcos

False Positive Guidance

Scenario: Legacy RDP Gateway Maintenance
- Context: An IT administrator uses a standard RDP client (e.g., Microsoft Remote Desktop Connection or mstsc.exe) to connect to a jump host. The connection string or process arguments may contain specific IP addresses or port numbers that match the Remcos IOCs (e.g., 192.168.x.x:3389 or specific hash values if the client binary is old).
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the parent process is mstsc.exe or conhost.exe and the connection destination is within the internal RDP Gateway subnet (e.g., 10.20.0.0/24). Additionally, exclude if the process path is C:\Windows\System32\mstsc.exe.
Scenario: Scheduled Backup Job with Specific Port
- Context: A nightly backup job (e.g., Veeam, Commvault, or Acronis) uses a custom agent that listens on or connects to a non-standard port (e.g., 8080 or 54321) which coincidentally matches one of the Remcos IOCs. The job runs under a service account and is scheduled via Task Scheduler.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the process is known backup software (e.g., veeam.exe, commvaultagent.exe, acronisagent.exe) and the process path is within the vendor’s installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Veeam\...). Also, exclude if the parent process is svchost.exe (Service Host) and the service name matches the backup service.
Scenario: Developer Testing with Localhost Bindings
- Context: A developer runs a local application or