This hypothesis targets the presence of TinyNuke ransomware indicators, which typically manifest as unauthorized file encryption and cryptocurrency exfiltration attempts following initial access via phishing or exploit kits. Proactively hunting for these IOCs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints early, potentially isolating affected systems before the ransomware fully propagates and disrupts critical business operations.
Malware Family: TinyNuke Total IOCs: 3 IOC Types: sha1_hash, sha256_hash, md5_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| sha256_hash | e72b03d7ce71ec92460622726d6bc55228eb8a62d39e82d8749f45fe497ba35c | payload | 2026-09-08 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 8183f64cc8f6bb0e31906941cb2585d263e2e484 | payload | 2026-09-08 | 95% |
| md5_hash | d3a52221539ad3c09e494d95034eb992 | payload | 2026-09-08 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - TinyNuke
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["e72b03d7ce71ec92460622726d6bc55228eb8a62d39e82d8749f45fe497ba35c", "8183f64cc8f6bb0e31906941cb2585d263e2e484", "d3a52221539ad3c09e494d95034eb992"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A DevOps engineer uses a legitimate internal tool, such as Veeam Backup & Replication or Commvault, to perform a full-system image restore or deduplication on a critical database server. The restore process may temporarily lock or rewrite large chunks of data, potentially mimicking the file-encryption behavior of TinyNuke if the detection logic relies on high-volume file modification rates or specific hash patterns that overlap with backup metadata.
vbrservice.exe, cvpp.exe) or exclude file paths located in standard backup storage directories (e.g., C:\ProgramData\Veeam\Backup\, C:\Commvault\Content\).Scenario: An IT administrator runs a scheduled PowerShell script using robocopy or rsync to synchronize configuration files or log archives between a source server and a central log aggregation node (e.g., Splunk or ELK stack). If the script uses compression or encryption algorithms (like AES) for transit, the temporary creation of encrypted file artifacts or rapid file replacement could trigger IOCs related to file encryption or unusual file extension changes.
powershell.exe or pwsh.exe and the command line contains specific synchronization verbs (e.g., /MIR, --encrypt), or exclude file paths ending in common archive extensions (.zip, .tar.gz) within designated log transfer directories.Scenario: A security team performs a controlled “purple team” exercise or a penetration test where they deploy a benign canary token or a test ransomware mimic (like Locky or a custom script) to validate detection coverage. This intentional deployment of a file with known TinyNuke-like hashes or behaviors in a non-production environment