This hunt identifies potential ValleyRAT infections by correlating known indicators of compromise with asset telemetry to detect the presence of this remote access trojan. Proactively hunting for these IOCs is critical because ValleyRAT provides adversaries with persistent remote control capabilities, enabling data exfiltration and lateral movement that can lead to significant business impact if left undetected.
Malware Family: ValleyRAT Total IOCs: 2 IOC Types: md5_hash, sha1_hash
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| md5_hash | e86536389821f0a45ff24820a6f2f2fe | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
| sha1_hash | 00adf03b95e931937d391890133b770c0b51c730 | payload | 2026-09-07 | 95% |
// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - ValleyRAT
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["e86536389821f0a45ff24820a6f2f2fe", "00adf03b95e931937d391890133b770c0b51c730"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
DeviceFileEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: A security engineer or DevOps team is performing a manual threat hunt or validation exercise using the ThreatFox IOC list (e.g., via Splunk threatintel lookup or Elastic intel feed) to verify that the ValleyRAT IOCs are correctly ingested and matched against current network traffic.
SecurityTeam or ThreatHunters AD group, or where the process name is splunkd.exe / elastic-agent and the destination IP matches the ThreatFox API endpoint (e.g., threatfox.abuse.ch).Scenario: An IT administrator is deploying a new endpoint detection tool (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon or Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) and runs a one-time full scan or policy update that temporarily generates high-volume telemetry matching generic RAT behavioral IOCs (such as specific registry keys or file paths) associated with ValleyRAT.
process_name is FalconSensor.exe or MsMpEng.exe and the event_time falls within a 15-minute window following a known scheduled maintenance job (e.g., DailyEndpointScan scheduled task).Scenario: A developer is testing a new internal application that uses a third-party library known to bundle a component with a file hash or network beacon pattern identical to one of the ValleyRAT IOCs (e.g., a specific SHA256 hash of a helper DLL).
file_path contains the application’s unique directory (e.g., C:\Apps\InternalTool\bin\) and the user is a member of the DevTeam group, or add