ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving the Vidar infostealer by monitoring for matches against a curated set of 24 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) known to facilitate credential theft and data exfiltration. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these signals in Azure Sentinel because Vidar’s prevalence in modern supply chain attacks necessitates early identification of its specific network artifacts to prevent lateral movement and sensitive data loss before full-scale infection occurs.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 24 IOC Types: domain, md5_hash, sha256_hash, sha1_hash, url

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
url	`hxxps://jax.sm188dadu.top/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
domain	`jax.sm188dadu.top`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
url	`hxxps://jax[.]10001slot.org/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
domain	`jax[.]10001slot.org`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
domain	`prc.sm188daftar.com`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
url	`hxxps://178[.]105[.]46[.]149`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
url	`hxxps://2[.]29[.]8[.]156`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
domain	`prc[.]10001toto.org`	botnet_cc	2026-08-16	100%
domain	`joe.sm188dadu.top`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	100%
url	`hxxps://joe.sm188dadu.top/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	100%
domain	`joe[.]10001slot.org`	botnet_cc	2026-08-15	100%
md5_hash	`f9c60eb51354ab07885428d7b868ade6`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha256_hash	`63eedb85b370d3d55a6023987dc1ca36c49074b364804b3187aa9db9eac2dd33`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha1_hash	`89dba32d78049d5650f10eb53173461a4969b673`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha1_hash	`fb837122ffb8b7041986db79fdd5e908d8ec38c8`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
md5_hash	`4d4dad091692dc25b7ab60efab9fc5e3`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
md5_hash	`9327108ce3c50647935244813d506f4d`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha256_hash	`f2b7f869036f558eabe71d5f73820dd56a58269d3db1435f26daeeb687c49f9d`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
md5_hash	`25f8beb77d6bbfd007a326d24978827e`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha256_hash	`1d118a9482bb8f30bb53c18c8441d5aa8b21ee823206c630238edf0f99ec568e`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha1_hash	`01e3a1b3b3f89bf99c183aea978f17cf890eea01`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha256_hash	`769c5186f40c16fa4e4871bf488301c01e89e3e94f1244f979e1b12b7f244ded`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha1_hash	`77f274a99d94bdab1709eff41f801bf893393130`	payload	2026-08-15	95%
sha1_hash	`63a9e6a56ce653494116948cb043fd275b5ee5b5`	payload	2026-08-15	95%

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["jax.sm188dadu.top", "jax.10001slot.org", "prc.sm188daftar.com", "prc.10001toto.org", "joe.sm188dadu.top", "joe.10001slot.org"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://jax.sm188dadu.top/", "https://jax.10001slot.org/", "https://178.105.46.149", "https://2.29.8.156", "https://joe.sm188dadu.top/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Hash Hunt

// Hunt for files matching known malicious hashes
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_hashes = dynamic(["f9c60eb51354ab07885428d7b868ade6", "63eedb85b370d3d55a6023987dc1ca36c49074b364804b3187aa9db9eac2dd33", "89dba32d78049d5650f10eb53173461a4969b673", "fb837122ffb8b7041986db79fdd5e908d8ec38c8", "4d4dad091692dc25b7ab60efab9fc5e3", "9327108ce3c50647935244813d506f4d", "f2b7f869036f558eabe71d5f73820dd56a58269d3db1435f26daeeb687c49f9d", "25f8beb77d6bbfd007a326d24978827e", "1d118a9482bb8f30bb53c18c8441d5aa8b21ee823206c630238edf0f99ec568e", "01e3a1b3b3f89bf99c183aea978f17cf890eea01", "769c5186f40c16fa4e4871bf488301c01e89e3e94f1244f979e1b12b7f244ded", "77f274a99d94bdab1709eff41f801bf893393130", "63a9e6a56ce653494116948cb043fd275b5ee5b5"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where SHA256 in (malicious_hashes) or SHA1 in (malicious_hashes) or MD5 in (malicious_hashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`DeviceFileEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DnsEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`UrlClickEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding exclusion strategies for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Security Scanning by Endpoint Protection Agents
- Context: Enterprise endpoint protection suites (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint, CrowdStrike Falcon) frequently perform scheduled deep scans or update checks that connect to external threat intelligence feeds. These agents may generate network traffic or process executions matching Vidar’s known IOCs (specifically hash values or domain connections) as part of their routine telemetry collection.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create a rule exclusion based on the Process Name and Parent Process. Exclude alerts where the parent process is MsMpEng.exe (Microsoft Defender), FalconSensorService.exe (CrowdStrike), or CarbonBlack-Sensor.exe, provided the user context is SYSTEM or a dedicated service account.
Scenario: Scheduled Software Updates via Package Management Tools
- Context: IT Operations teams often use package management tools like SCCM (Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager) or Ansible to deploy software updates during maintenance windows. If an update package includes a component that shares a digital signature hash or network destination with the Vidar IOCs, the deployment script execution will trigger the rule.
- Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion window (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC) combined with a Process Path filter. Exclude alerts where the process path contains standard update directories such as \Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager\, and the user account is a known service account like DOMAIN\SCCM-Deploy-Svc.
Scenario: Cloud Backup and Synchronization Services
- Context: Enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam, Rubrik) or file synchronization