ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt targets adversary behavior where Vidar malware infiltrates endpoints via phishing campaigns to steal banking credentials and exfiltrate sensitive data over encrypted channels. Proactively hunting for these specific indicators in Azure Sentinel is critical to detect early-stage credential theft before attackers can leverage stolen identities for lateral movement or financial fraud.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 5 IOC Types: domain, url

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["f4m.kijangturbo88.top", "f4m.ambiltogel.net"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://f4m.kijangturbo88.top/", "https://f4m.ambiltogel.net/", "https://lmstamper.com/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

References

• ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters and exclusions:

• Legitimate Phishing Simulation Campaigns

  • Scenario: The Security Awareness team uses tools like KnowBe4, Proofpoint, or Microsoft Defender for Office 365 to run monthly phishing simulations. These campaigns often deploy test emails containing links to landing pages hosted on domains that may share IP ranges or certificate patterns with known Vidar distribution networks, triggering the “malicious URL” logic.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion list for the specific domain names and IP addresses used by your internal simulation platform (e.g., *.knowbe4.com, *.proofpoint.com). Additionally, filter traffic originating from the internal Security Awareness distribution server’s MAC address or hostname.

• Scheduled Software Updates via Centralized Management

  • Scenario: Enterprise endpoint management tools like Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM/SCCM), Ivanti, or Jamf execute scheduled deployment jobs to push security patches or application updates. If the update repository or a third-party software vendor’s download server shares an IP reputation profile with Vidar’s command-and-control infrastructure, the outbound encrypted connections during these windows will trigger the rule.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic generated by specific Service Accounts (e.g., svc-sccm-dist, svc-jamf-agent) or restrict the alert to exclude known update schedules (e.g., 02:00–04:00 UTC on Tuesdays) for these management tools. Whitelist the specific URLs and certificate issuers associated with your software supply chain vendors.

• Admin Remote Access via Cloud Gateways

  • Scenario: System administrators frequently access remote servers using **Microsoft Azure