ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This hunt detects adversary activity involving the Vidar infostealer by monitoring for matches against a curated set of 30 known Indicators of Compromise (IOCs). Proactively hunting for these signals in Azure Sentinel is critical to identify early-stage infections and prevent data exfiltration before the malware establishes persistence or spreads laterally across the network.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: Vidar Total IOCs: 30 IOC Types: ip:port, url, domain

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`62[.]238[.]98[.]35:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`62[.]238[.]106[.]96:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`2[.]29[.]13[.]241:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`2[.]29[.]7[.]186:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
ip:port	`158[.]94[.]210[.]96:443`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`ryr[.]1131gg.org`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`guc[.]1131gg.org`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`ses.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`nhg.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`ges.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`kra.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`brr.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`sto.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`rex.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`bib.sm188daftar.mom`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
domain	`guc.sm188dnsx.top`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://brr.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://sto.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://rex.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://bib.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://ses.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://nhg.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://ges.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://kra.sm188daftar.mom/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%
url	`hxxps://62[.]238[.]106[.]96/`	botnet_cc	2026-08-20	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["158.94.210.96", "2.29.13.241", "62.238.106.96", "62.238.98.35", "2.29.7.186"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["158.94.210.96", "2.29.13.241", "62.238.106.96", "62.238.98.35", "2.29.7.186"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

KQL: Domain Hunt

// Hunt for DNS queries to known malicious domains
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["ryr.1131gg.org", "guc.1131gg.org", "ses.sm188daftar.mom", "nhg.sm188daftar.mom", "ges.sm188daftar.mom", "kra.sm188daftar.mom", "brr.sm188daftar.mom", "sto.sm188daftar.mom", "rex.sm188daftar.mom", "bib.sm188daftar.mom", "guc.sm188dnsx.top"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses, QueryType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Hunt

// Hunt for access to known malicious URLs
// Source: ThreatFox - Vidar
let malicious_urls = dynamic(["https://brr.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://sto.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://rex.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://bib.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://ses.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://nhg.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://ges.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://kra.sm188daftar.mom/", "https://62.238.106.96/", "https://2.29.13.241/", "https://2.29.7.186/", "https://158.94.210.96/", "https://ryr.1131gg.org/", "https://guc.1131gg.org/"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Url has_any (malicious_urls)
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DnsEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`UrlClickEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — Vidar

False Positive Guidance

Here are specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filtering strategies for the ThreatFox: Vidar IOCs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Software Deployment via Endpoint Management Tools
- Context: Enterprise deployment tools like Microsoft Intune, SCCM (Configuration Manager), or Jamf often distribute security agents, browser plugins, or utility software that may contain binaries matching Vidar’s hash signatures. For instance, a scheduled update for an internal “Secure Browser” might trigger the rule if its installer shares an IOCs with known Vidar components.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Process Name of the deployment engine (e.g., ccmsetup.exe, intuneagent.exe) and filter out events where the Parent Process is a trusted management service. Additionally, exclude specific file paths known to host these deployments, such as C:\Program Files\Microsoft Intune Agent\.
Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus or EDR Scans
- Context: During nightly maintenance windows, third-party security suites like CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or Symantec Endpoint Protection perform deep scans. These tools often load internal modules or update their own definitions, which may generate network traffic or file creation events matching Vidar’s IOCs (specifically regarding domain resolution or specific DLL loading).
- Filter/Exclusion: Implement a time-based exclusion for the rule during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00 UTC daily) on non-critical workstations. Alternatively, filter events where the User Account is a dedicated service account (e.g., NT SERVICE\AntivirusEngine or DOMAIN\svc_scan) rather than an interactive user session.
Scenario: Legacy Application Updates via Scheduled Tasks