This detection rule identifies adversary activity linked to the VShell malware by monitoring for seven specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) known to facilitate command and control or lateral movement within Azure environments. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel is critical because early identification of VShell IOCs allows the SOC team to isolate compromised assets before the threat escalates into a broader network breach.
Malware Family: VShell Total IOCs: 7 IOC Types: ip:port
| Type | Value | Threat Type | First Seen | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ip:port | 72[.]11[.]144[.]112:80 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 47[.]107[.]122[.]241:40008 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 101[.]34[.]235[.]198:8085 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 154[.]37[.]214[.]1:60081 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 43[.]225[.]56[.]110:8888 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 124[.]222[.]85[.]19:8088 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
| ip:port | 195[.]114[.]193[.]201:80 | botnet_cc | 2026-07-10 | 100% |
// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - VShell
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.222.85.19", "47.107.122.241", "72.11.144.112", "43.225.56.110", "195.114.193.201", "101.34.235.198", "154.37.214.1"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.222.85.19", "47.107.122.241", "72.11.144.112", "43.225.56.110", "195.114.193.201", "101.34.235.198", "154.37.214.1"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DeviceNetworkEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: VShell IOCs detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:
Endpoint Protection Scanning of Quarantine Archives
\\FileServer\Backups\LegacyApps\VShell_*) or exclude the specific EDR service account (e.g., svc-crowdstrike-agent) from triggering this rule when accessing these directories.IT Administration of Remote Desktop Sessions
Automated Compliance Reporting via PowerShell