ThreatFox: VShell IOCs | SOC Hunt Feed

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies adversary activity by matching network and host logs against five specific Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) linked to the VShell threat actor, which is known for targeting enterprise environments through sophisticated command-and-control channels. A proactive hunt in Azure Sentinel is essential because early identification of these IOCs allows the SOC team to isolate compromised assets before the adversary establishes persistence or exfiltrates sensitive data.

IOC Summary

Malware Family: VShell Total IOCs: 5 IOC Types: ip:port

Type	Value	Threat Type	First Seen	Confidence
ip:port	`207[.]148[.]126[.]156:28884`	botnet_cc	2026-08-26	100%
ip:port	`39[.]107[.]139[.]26:80`	botnet_cc	2026-08-26	100%
ip:port	`149[.]104[.]28[.]204:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-26	100%
ip:port	`124[.]222[.]150[.]13:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-26	100%
ip:port	`118[.]178[.]143[.]61:8084`	botnet_cc	2026-08-26	100%

KQL: Ip Hunt

// Hunt for network connections to known malicious IPs
// Source: ThreatFox - VShell
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.222.150.13", "207.148.126.156", "39.107.139.26", "118.178.143.61", "149.104.28.204"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where DestinationIP in (malicious_ips) or SourceIP in (malicious_ips)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Ip Hunt Device

// Hunt in Defender for Endpoint network events
let malicious_ips = dynamic(["124.222.150.13", "207.148.126.156", "39.107.139.26", "118.178.143.61", "149.104.28.204"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where RemoteIP in (malicious_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc

Required Data Sources

Sentinel Table	Notes
`CommonSecurityLog`	Ensure this data connector is enabled
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	Ensure this data connector is enabled

References

ThreatFox — VShell

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the ThreatFox: VShell IOCs detection rule, along with targeted filters and exclusions suitable for an enterprise environment:

Scenario: Automated Vulnerability Scanning by Qualys or Tenable
- Context: Enterprise vulnerability scanners (e.g., Qualys Cloud Agent, Tenable Nessus) frequently probe internal hosts to identify open ports and services. When these agents scan the VShell service port, they may trigger network traffic patterns matching the rule’s IOCs, specifically if the scanner mimics a shell connection or probes specific registry keys associated with VShell.
- Filter/Exclusion: Exclude source IPs belonging to the vulnerability management subnet (e.g., 10.20.50.x) and filter out events where the process name is qualyspc.exe or tenable_agent.exe.
Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs via Veeam or Commvault
- Context: During nightly backup windows, enterprise backup solutions (e.g., Veeam Backup & Replication) often interact with application services to ensure data consistency. If the backup agent initiates a connection to the VShell service to verify state or lock files before archiving, it may generate IOCs that resemble active shell sessions.
- Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for events occurring within the defined maintenance window (e.g., 22:00–04:00 local time) where the parent process is vbr.exe (Veeam) or commvault_agent.exe.
Scenario: Patch Management Deployment by Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM)
- Context: When SCCM deploys patches to servers running VShell, the deployment engine may execute a script that restarts the service or queries its status. This interaction can trigger file system and registry