Tor Client/Browser Execution

Hunt Hypothesis

Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Tor Client/Browser Execution
id: 62f7c9bf-9135-49b2-8aeb-1e54a6ecc13c
status: test
description: Detects the use of Tor or Tor-Browser to connect to onion routing networks
references:
    - https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
author: frack113
date: 2022-02-20
modified: 2025-10-27
tags:
    - attack.command-and-control
    - attack.t1090.003
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        - Description: 'Tor Browser'
        - Product: 'Tor Browser'
        - Image|endswith:
              - '\tor.exe'
              - '\Tor Browser\Browser\firefox.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high
regression_tests_path: regression_data/rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_browsers_tor_execution/info.yml

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imProcessCreate
| where TargetProcessFileDescription =~ "Tor Browser" or TargetProcessFileProduct =~ "Tor Browser" or (TargetProcessName endswith "\\tor.exe" or TargetProcessName endswith "\\Tor Browser\\Browser\\firefox.exe")

Required Data Sources

False Positive Guidance

• Unknown

MITRE ATT&CK Context

• Tactic: Command and Control
• Technique: T1090.003 — T1090.003

References

• https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/detecting-tor-use-with-logpoint/
• SigmaHQ Rule