This detection targets adversaries utilizing the Ponmocup Downloader to establish initial footholds by retrieving and executing secondary payloads within the Azure environment. Proactive hunting for this behavior is essential to identify early-stage supply chain compromises or lateral movement attempts before they escalate into critical incidents, even when individual events are flagged as low severity.
rule Trj_Ponmocup_Downloader {
meta:
author = "Centro Criptológico Nacional (CCN)"
ref ="https://www.ccn-cert.cni.es/informes/informes-ccn-cert-publicos.html"
description = "Ponmocup Downloader"
strings:
$mz = { 4d 5a }
$vb5 = "VB5" fullword ascii
$tpb = "www.thepiratebay.org" fullword wide
$ua = "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.2; SV1)" fullword wide
condition:
($mz at 0) and ($vb5) and ($tpb) and ($ua)
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 4 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Ponmocup Downloader detection rule in an enterprise environment, along with recommended filters or exclusions:
Scheduled Software Update via SCCM/Intune
ccmexec.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.IntuneManagementExtension.exe, and restrict the rule to only trigger outside of defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–06:00 UTC).Automated Backup Agent Initialization
10.x.x.x for internal backup servers) and filter out events where the user context is a dedicated service account like NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM or DOMAIN\VeeamSvc.IT Admin Manual Patch Deployment
\\FileServer\Deployments) rather than an external public URL, triggering the rule due to high network