This detection identifies potential malicious activity where adversaries utilize specific unpacking mechanisms to execute hidden payloads within the environment. Proactive hunting for this behavior is essential in Azure Sentinel to uncover stealthy threats that may evade standard signature-based defenses by analyzing low-severity YARA matches before they escalate into larger incidents.
rule Upack021betaDwing
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { BE 88 01 40 00 AD 8B F8 6A 04 95 A5 33 C0 AB 48 AB F7 D8 59 F3 AB C1 E0 0A B5 ?? F3 AB AD 50 97 51 58 8D 54 85 5C FF 16 72 5A 2C 03 73 02 B0 00 3C 07 72 02 2C 03 50 0F B6 5F FF C1 E3 ?? B3 00 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Upack021betaDwing detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated deployment of software updates via Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune.
.msi or .cab) containing nested DLLs that match the signature pattern of the rule. This is common during nightly maintenance windows.ccmsetup.exe, wsman.exe, and msiexec.exe when running under the context of the “System” account or specific service accounts (e.g., DOMAIN\SCCM-Deploy).Scenario: Execution of scheduled backup jobs using Veeam Backup & Replication or Acronis Cyber Protect.
C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup\Staging or D:\Acronis\Temp) and exclude the parent process names Veeam.Backup.Service.exe and acronis_backup_agent.exe.Scenario: Development environment activity involving Visual Studio or Jenkins CI/CD pipelines.