This rule detects the presence of the Upack v0.1 and v0.2 packers, which are commonly used by adversaries to compress and obfuscate malicious executables to evade static analysis. Proactively hunting for these signatures in Azure Sentinel helps identify potentially packed malware artifacts that may be staging or executing on endpoints, allowing the SOC to investigate suspicious processes before they fully deploy their payload.
rule Upackv01xv02xDwing
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { BE 88 01 [2] AD 8B F8 95 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Upack utility (a common Windows unpacking tool) by a system administrator or automated script to extract compressed archives (e.g., .zip, .rar, .7z) during software deployment or log collection.
wsadmin.exe, sc.exe, powershell.exe with specific arguments) or where the command line contains standard unpacking flags (e.g., /x, /e, -o). Additionally, exclude if the process path resides in a standard administrative tools directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\7-Zip\, C:\Sysinternals\).Task Scheduler running a custom script) that uses Upack to decompress temporary files or configuration backups before processing, often running under a service account like NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM or a dedicated svc_backup account.
svchost.exe (with specific service names like Schedule or WSearch) or if the user context is a known service account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc_backup, NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM). Also, consider excluding if the working directory is a known temp or backup path (e.g., C:\Temp\, D:\Backups\).Upack as part of a build pipeline or local testing environment where developers manually extract dependency packages or test data sets.
DevTeam, QA_Access) or if the process is launched from a known development directory (e.g.,