This detection identifies the execution of a specific unpacking tool or process associated with the “Upackv039finalDwing” signature, which often indicates an adversary attempting to extract and analyze compressed payloads to evade static analysis. A SOC team should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to uncover potential fileless attacks or staged malware deployments that utilize custom unpacking mechanisms to bypass traditional endpoint protections.
rule Upackv039finalDwing
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 56 10 E2 E3 B1 04 D3 E0 03 E8 8D 53 18 33 C0 55 40 51 D3 E0 8B EA 91 }
$a1 = { FF 76 38 AD 50 8B 3E BE F0 [3] 6A 27 59 F3 A5 FF 76 04 83 C8 FF }
condition:
$a0 or $a1
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the Upackv039finalDwing detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
.msi, .cab, or .zip) containing third-party applications (e.g., Adobe Acrobat, Zoom updates) onto the C:\Program Files directory. The YARA rule may flag these extraction events as suspicious packing/unpacking activity typical of malware droppers.ccmsetup.exe, AppxDeploymentAgent.exe, and msiexec.exe. Additionally, exclude file paths matching the pattern C:\Program Files\* or C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\* from triggering this specific rule.Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Heuristic Scans
FalconSensorService.exe, S1Agent.exe, Rtvscan64.exe). Implement a time-based filter to suppress alerts during defined maintenance windows (e.g., 02:00–04:00 local time) when these heavy scanning jobs typically run.Scenario: IT Admin Manual Archive Extraction