URLhaus: 176-65-139-201 Malicious URLs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversary activity involving known malicious URLs associated with the IP address 176.65.139.201, which often signal initial access or command-and-control communications used in phishing and malware campaigns. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these indicators within Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints and prevent lateral movement before attackers can establish a persistent foothold in the network.

IOC Summary

Threat: 176-65-139-201 Total URLs: 3 Active URLs: 1

KQL: Url Dns Hunt

// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: 176-65-139-201
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["176.65.139.201"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Proxy Hunt

// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["176.65.139.201"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• URLhaus

False Positive Guidance

False Positive Scenarios for “URLhaus: 176-65-139-201 Malicious URLs”

• Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates

  • Context: The enterprise endpoint protection suite (e.g., Microsoft Defender for Endpoint or CrowdStrike Falcon) automatically queries the vendor’s update server at update.antivirus-vendor.com during off-hours. If this domain resolves to an IP range overlapping with 176-65-139-201, the rule triggers on every workstation.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create a detection exclusion based on the specific process name (e.g., MsMpEng.exe or FalconSensor.exe) and the destination URL pattern containing /definitions/update. Alternatively, whitelist the specific FQDN used for updates in the network proxy policy to bypass the rule.

• Scenario: Automated Backup and Cloud Sync Jobs

  • Context: Managed backup agents (such as Veeam Agent or Carbonite) running on file servers initiate nightly synchronization tasks connecting to a cloud storage gateway hosted at 176-65-139-201. The traffic is legitimate data transfer, but the rule flags the connection as malicious due to the IP reputation.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Implement an exclusion for the specific service account running the backup job (e.g., DOMAIN\svc-backup-agent) and restrict the detection scope to exclude traffic originating from the “Backup Servers” security group in the SIEM logic.

• Scenario: Third-Party SaaS Integration Webhooks

  • Context: The organization’s CRM system (e.g., Salesforce or HubSpot) utilizes a webhook endpoint hosted on 176-65-139-201 to push real-time lead data. When the integration service