This hypothesis targets adversaries leveraging 32-bit malicious URLs to execute payloads or establish command-and-control channels, often exploiting legacy application compatibility or specific binary architectures. Proactively hunting for these URLs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints or lateral movement attempts before they mature into full-blown breaches, particularly in environments where 32-bit applications remain prevalent.
Threat: 32-bit Total URLs: 50 Active URLs: 44
| URL | Status | Threat | Date Added |
|---|---|---|---|
hxxp://119.180.62.17:32897/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://103.140.87.105:43482/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://103.140.87.105:43482/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://115.57.238.102:33308/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://113.17.176.184:42461/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://115.57.238.102:33308/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://222.246.41.42:44313/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://125.106.122.6:34466/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://113.255.193.216:43347/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://182.183.25.199:51904/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://125.106.122.6:34466/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://219.157.201.128:48170/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://219.157.201.128:48170/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://175.146.154.144:50845/bin.sh | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://115.50.68.1:49733/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://115.50.68.1:49733/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://105.224.228.138:51349/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://60.198.35.226:40639/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://183.151.130.98:49538/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://60.198.35.226:40639/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://105.224.228.138:51349/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://175.165.86.86:52969/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://42.231.73.79:58966/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://115.49.201.132:50072/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
hxxp://183.151.130.98:49538/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-17 |
// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: 32-bit
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["119.180.62.17", "219.157.201.128", "116.138.241.167", "113.17.176.184", "115.57.238.102", "115.50.68.1", "42.231.73.79", "60.214.59.175", "182.183.25.199", "190.109.228.251", "113.255.193.216", "180.244.8.137", "60.198.35.226", "125.106.122.6", "103.140.87.105", "105.224.228.138", "183.151.130.98", "175.165.86.86", "196.189.101.82"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["119.180.62.17", "219.157.201.128", "116.138.241.167", "113.17.176.184", "115.57.238.102", "115.50.68.1", "42.231.73.79", "60.214.59.175", "182.183.25.199", "190.109.228.251", "113.255.193.216", "180.244.8.137", "60.198.35.226", "125.106.122.6", "103.140.87.105", "105.224.228.138", "183.151.130.98", "175.165.86.86", "196.189.101.82"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) ... Adobe Flash Player) or restrict the rule to exclude traffic from known legacy application service accounts.*.citrix.com, *.gotomeeting.com) or filter out requests where the Referer header matches the internal application’s origin.svc-backup, backup-agent) or filter based on the process name initiating the network connection (e.g., vssadmin.exe, `backup