URLhaus: exe Malicious URLs

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversary behavior where threat actors distribute executable malware through seven distinct malicious URLs flagged by URLhaus to initiate command-and-control or payload delivery. The SOC team should proactively hunt for these indicators in Azure Sentinel to rapidly isolate compromised endpoints and prevent lateral movement before the executables establish persistence on the network.

IOC Summary

Threat: exe Total URLs: 7 Active URLs: 7

KQL: Url Dns Hunt

// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: exe
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["103.229.53.84", "hypercorevector5.lol", "www.justturtle.com"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc

KQL: Url Proxy Hunt

// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["103.229.53.84", "hypercorevector5.lol", "www.justturtle.com"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Required Data Sources

References

• URLhaus

False Positive Guidance

Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios and corresponding filters for the URLhaus: exe Malicious URLs detection rule in an enterprise environment:

• Scenario: Automated Security Software Updates via Cloud Repositories

  • Context: Enterprise endpoint protection suites (e.g., CrowdStrike Falcon, Microsoft Defender for Endpoint) frequently download update definitions or new executable agents directly from their cloud management consoles. These downloads often trigger the rule because they are .exe files fetched over HTTPS from known security vendor domains that may be newly added to threat intelligence feeds.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude traffic originating from trusted internal jump hosts or specific security vendor IP ranges (e.g., *.crowdstrike.com, *.microsoftonline.net) where the user agent contains keywords like “CrowdStrikeUpdate” or “DefenderCloud”.

• Scenario: Scheduled Deployment of Internal Line-of-Business Applications

  • Context: The IT Operations team utilizes Microsoft System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune to push internal .exe installers (e.g., a proprietary HR portal client or a custom inventory tool) to thousands of workstations during off-hours. These scheduled jobs generate high-volume URL requests for executable downloads that mimic the pattern of external malicious downloads.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the destination domain being part of the internal corporate namespace (e.g., *.company.local or specific internal subdomains) and restrict the rule to only trigger on traffic originating from non-management workstations, excluding servers running SCCM/Intune agents.

• Scenario: Legitimate Third-Party Vendor Remote Support Sessions

  • Context: External vendors (e.g., SAP support, Oracle DBAs) initiate remote assistance sessions using tools like TeamViewer or AnyDesk. These tools often download a temporary .exe launcher from the vendor’s public URL to