This hypothesis targets adversaries leveraging the URLhaus malware_download family to establish command-and-control channels for data exfiltration or secondary payload deployment. Proactively hunting for these specific malicious URLs in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify compromised endpoints early, preventing the full execution of the downloader and subsequent lateral movement within the environment.
Threat: malware_download Total URLs: 3 Active URLs: 2
| URL | Status | Threat | Date Added |
|---|---|---|---|
hxxp://115.60.223.220:39065/i | online | malware_download | 2026-09-08 |
hxxp://42.225.218.136:55344/i | offline | malware_download | 2026-09-08 |
hxxp://42.225.218.136:55344/bin.sh | online | malware_download | 2026-09-08 |
// Hunt for DNS resolution of URLhaus malicious domains
// Threat: malware_download
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["42.225.218.136", "115.60.223.220"]);
DnsEvents
| where Name has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Name, IPAddresses
| order by TimeGenerated desc
// Hunt for web traffic to URLhaus malicious domains
let malicious_domains = dynamic(["42.225.218.136", "115.60.223.220"]);
CommonSecurityLog
| where RequestURL has_any (malicious_domains) or DestinationHostName has_any (malicious_domains)
| project TimeGenerated, SourceIP, RequestURL, DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by TimeGenerated desc
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
CommonSecurityLog | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
DnsEvents | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
*.java.com, *.oracle.com) or specific legacy application process names (e.g., java.exe, pos_service.exe) when the destination URL matches a verified vendor certificate or known IP range.jenkins-agent, gitlab-runner, azure-devops-agent) and internal artifact repository domains (e.g., nexus.internal.corp, registry-1.docker.io) if the download occurs over a trusted internal network segment or via a verified service account.*.adobe.com, `*.microsoft.com