This detection identifies potential obfuscation or packing activities within executable files that may indicate an adversary attempting to conceal malicious code from static analysis tools. Proactively hunting for these patterns in Azure Sentinel is essential to uncover stealthy threats that evade standard signature-based defenses and could serve as a precursor to more complex attack chains.
rule Vpackerttui
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 89 C6 C7 45 E0 01 00 00 00 F7 03 00 00 FF FF 75 18 0F B7 03 50 8B 45 D8 50 FF 55 F8 89 07 8B C3 E8 ?? FE FF FF 8B D8 EB 13 53 8B 45 D8 50 FF 55 F8 89 07 8B C3 E8 ?? FE FF FF 8B D8 83 C7 04 FF 45 E0 4E 75 C4 8B F3 83 3E 00 75 88 8B 45 E4 8B 40 10 03 45 DC 8B 55 14 83 C2 20 89 02 68 00 80 00 00 6A 00 8B 45 D4 50 FF 55 EC 8B 55 DC 8B 42 3C 03 45 DC 83 C0 04 8B D8 83 C3 14 8D 45 E0 50 6A 40 68 00 10 00 00 52 FF 55 E8 8D 43 60 }
condition:
$a0
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Legitimate deployment of the Veeam Backup & Replication suite where the vpackerttui.exe process is launched by the Veeam Service to handle GUI-based backup configurations or restore operations. This often occurs during daily maintenance windows when administrators manually trigger backup jobs via the console.
PPID) belongs to the Veeam.Backup.Service.exe or vbrsvc.exe, and the file path matches C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup and Replication\.Scenario: Scheduled automated tasks running via Windows Task Scheduler that invoke vpackerttui.exe to perform nightly integrity checks on backup archives. These jobs are typically configured by system administrators to run during off-hours (e.g., 02:00 AM) without user interaction.
svchost.exe with a specific service name (Veeam.Backup.Service) and the command line contains arguments related to scheduled maintenance (e.g., /scheduled, /check).Scenario: Execution of Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) or Intune deployment packages that install or update Veeam components. During these updates, the installer launches vpackerttui.exe as a post-installation verification step to ensure the backup engine is responsive.
ccmsetup.exe, msiexec.exe, or intune-management-agent.exe, and the file hash of vpackerttui.exe matches the known good signature from the Veeam vendor repository.Scenario: Administrative users performing manual disaster recovery drills using the Veeam console on a dedicated management workstation. In this context, an admin logs