This hypothesis targets the execution of VProtector-packed executables, a technique often used by adversaries to obfuscate malware payloads and evade static analysis. Proactively hunting for this specific build in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify potentially compromised endpoints early, as VProtector is frequently associated with information stealers and remote access trojans deployed via phishing or supply chain attacks.
rule VProtectorV10Build20041213testvcasm
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 6A FF 68 1A 89 40 00 68 56 89 40 00 64 A1 00 00 00 00 50 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 E8 03 00 00 00 C7 84 00 58 EB 01 E9 83 C0 07 50 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
C:\Program Files\InternalTools\ or C:\AppData\Local\... and are executed by service accounts or user profiles.
C:\Program Files\InternalTools\ or C:\Program Files (x86)\LegacyApps\ where the executable name matches known legacy application binaries (e.g., LegacyReportGen.exe).DailyDBBackup) runs a custom wrapper script or a small C++/C# utility that has been packed with VProtect 10 to reduce size or protect IP. This utility is located in C:\Scripts\Maintenance\ and is triggered by the Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe or taskschd.exe).
taskschd.exe or svchost.exe (specifically the Task Scheduler service) and the file path contains \Scripts\Maintenance\ or \BackupTools\.C:\Users\<User>\.vs\extensions\ or C:\Users\<User>\.idea\plugins\.
*