This detection identifies potential malware or suspicious applications utilizing the WWPACK v305c4 packaging engine that exhibit password checking and virus shielding behaviors, which may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or evade security controls. A SOC team should proactively hunt for this activity in Azure Sentinel to validate whether these specific YARA signatures represent legitimate software updates or early-stage malicious execution requiring deeper investigation before broader impact occurs.
rule WWPACKv305c4ExtrPasswcheckVirshield
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 03 05 C0 1A B8 [2] 8C CA 03 D0 8C C9 81 C1 [2] 51 B9 [2] 51 06 06 B1 ?? 51 8C D3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the WWPACKv305c4ExtrPasswcheckVirshield detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Password Policy Compliance Scans by Microsoft Defender for Identity (MDI)
MsiInstaller.exe or AdmPwdService.exe running under the SYSTEM account when the command line contains keywords like /scan, /policy-check, or PasswordCompliance.Scenario: Scheduled Group Policy Password Reset Jobs via PowerShell
Reset-UserPasswords.ps1) to enforce password rotation for service accounts. The script invokes the Windows Crypto API, triggering the YARA rule due to the extraction of password verification logic within the virtual shield context.powershell.exe or pwsh.exe where the parent process is TaskSchedulerService (or svchost.exe with service name Schedule) and the script path resides in a designated secure folder, e.g., C:\ProgramData\ITOps\Scripts\.Scenario: Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) Health Checks by CrowdStrike Falcon
ExtrPasswcheckVirshield signature as it mimics a password verification event within the virtual shield layer.